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QUESTIONING THE PRACTICE OF
PRETRIAL DETENTION: SOME
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM
PHILADELPHIA
JOHN S. GOLDKAMP*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The role of pretrial detention in the American criminal justice system has long been questioned. 1 Within the last sixty years, pretrial detention in particular has been the source of social, legal, and research
debate. 2 The bail reform movement of the 1960's was in large part a
response to concerns about the institution of pretrial detention. 3 State
and local investigations of jails, focusing on conditions, resources, and
rights of the pretrial confined, 4 became increasingly common during the
1960's and 1970's as federal efforts to conduct censuses of jails and
surveys of their inmates5 provided new data which were descriptive of
* Associate Professor, Dep't of Criminal Justice, Temple University. Ph.D. School of
Criminal Justice, State University of New York at Albany, 1977; M.A. School of Criminal
Justice, State University of New York at Albany, 1975; B.A. Wesleyan University, 1969.
1 Perhaps the earliest criticism of the 'practice was offered by de Beaumont and de
Tocqueville during the nineteenth century. See G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOCQUEVILLE,
ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE

53 (reprint ed. 1964).
2 A. BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO
PENAL AFFAIRS,

A

(1966);

PENNSYLVANIA COMMITTEE ON

HOUSE OF DETENTION FOR PHILADELPHIA (1938); see R.

POUND

& F.

FRANKFURTER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND (reprint ed. 1968); Foote, Compelling Ap-

pearance in Court.- Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1954); W.
Morse & R. Beattie, Surve of the Administration of CriminalJusticein Oregon, 11 OR. L. REV. 100
(Supp. 1932).
3 D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 9-21 (1964).
4 The following sources represent a few of the many examples of these kinds of efforts. A.
ASHMAN, LOCKUP: NORTH CAROLINA LOOKS AT ITS LOCAL JAILS (1969); CALIFORNIA
BOARD OF CORRECTIONS, CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM STUDY: THE SYSTEM 26

(1971); H. MATTICK & R. SWEET, ILLINOIS JAILS (1969); NEW YORK

STATE COMM'N OF
INVESTIGATION, COUNTY JAILS AND PENITENTIARIES IN NEW YORK STATE 67 (1966); G.
STRACENSKY, TEXAS JAILS--PROBLEMS AND REFORMATION 43 (3 CRIMINAL JUSTICE MONOGRAPH No. 4, 1970).
5 See, e.g., LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION (LEAA), DEP'T OF Jus-

TICE, CENSUS OF JAILS AND SURVEY OF JAIL INMATES, 1978 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
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the overall dimensions of jail problems.
At the heart of the bail reform movement during the 1960's were
issues related to pretrial detention, many of which have received thorough review elsewhere. 6 Generally, critics of bail practices and of the
use of pretrial detention questioned the fairness and effectiveness of bail
practices that were so discretionary and that placed the detained at such
a disadvantage. Commentators noted that defendants who awaited adjudication in confinement suffered not only from the privations associated with incarceration in jail, but also experienced ruptures in family
and social ties, loss of employment, and restricted access to counsel
which impaired their ability to prepare an adequate defense. 7 A
number of studies focused on an additional apparent handicap: defendants who were detained seemed to have their cases dismissed less often
or charges dropped less often and to be convicted and sentenced to incarceration more often than their released counterparts.8
Although it is incorrect to suggest that the initial influence of bail
reform has totally diminished, the current focus on pretrial detention
reflects emphases somewhat different than those of the 1960's and early
1970's. Two recent developments, overcrowding in many of the nation's
jails and proposals and enactments for extended uses of pretrial detention, 9 are premised in part on serious concerns about the function and
performance of the pretrial detention institution.
LEAA, CENSUS]; LEAA, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF INMATES OF LOCAL JAILS, 1972:
ADVANCE REPORT (1972) [hereinafter LEAA, ADVANCE REPORT].
6 See generally D. FREED & D. WALD, supra note 3; R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRITIQUE
OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM 127 (1965);

J.

GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A

STUDY OF BAIL AND DETENTION IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 5-25 (1979); W. THOMAS, BAIL RE-

FORM IN AMERICA 227 (1976); Foote, The Coming ConstitutionalCrisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L.

REV. 959 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Foote, Cris in Bail-I]; Foote, The Coming Constitutional
Crisis in Bail" II, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1125 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Foote, Crisis in Bail: II].
7 See Foote, Crisis in Bail I, supra note 6, at 960. See generally ATrORNEY GENERAL'S
COMM. ON POVERTY & ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, POVERTY AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1963) [hereinafter cited as COMM.

ON POVERTY]; D. FREED & P. WALD, supra note 3; R. GOLDFARB, supra note 6; Alexander,

Glass, King, Palermo, Roberts & Schury, A Study ofthe Adminstration of Bail in New York City,
106 U.PA.L. REv. 685 (1958); Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim
Report on the Use of PretrialParole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 67 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Ares];
Foote, supra note 2.
8 See J. GOLDKAMP, supra note 6, at 185; Foote, supra note 2, at 1049-58; Landes, Legality
andReality." Some Evidence on CriminalProceedings, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 329 (1974); Morse &
Beattie, supra note 2, at 19; Rankin, The Efect of PretrialDetention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 641
(1964); SINGLE, The UnconstitutionalAdninistration of Bail: Bellamy V. theJudges of New York City,
8 CRIM. L. BULL. 459, 462 (1972).
9 See, e.g., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNERS, NATIONAL SURVEY OF COUNTY JAILS (1982), for a recent survey of population levels in county jails. For
examples of recent provisions for extended use of pretrial detention, see MICH. CONST. art. I,
§§ 15-16; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9; D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321 to -1332 (1981 & Supp. 1983);
WIsc. STAT. §§ 969.001-969.013 (West Supp. 1983-84).
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Both those seeking solutions to mounting overcrowding in urban
jails and proponents of pretrial or "preventive" detention measures1 0
have questioned the use of pretrial detention, though perhaps for very
different reasons. Analysts of jail crowding view bail-produced detention as a major and disproportionate contributor to the overcrowding
crisis. They believe that ineffective bail practices lead to unnecessary
detention of defendants who are poor, not very seriously charged, and
have reasonably strong community ties. 1 In contrast to this concern
with detention practices' systematic overinclusion, proponents of preventive detention assume that current practices do not successfully restrain dangerous defendants, but rather permit their release, thereby
threatening public safety. 12 Of course, these criticisms of the current
practice of pretrial detention in the United States are not mutually exclusive: pretrial jails simultaneously may overinclude low-risk defendants and underinclude those likely to abscond or pose a public danger.
It is noteworthy that discussions in both arenas-overcrowding and preventive detention-share as common ground the criticism that pretrial
detention is not sufficiently selective.

II.

BAIL AND DETENTION AS PREDICTION

Since pretrial detention affectuates a radical abridgment of the lib-

erty of confined defendants and not of those released before trial, questions about the use of detention and whether pretrial detention performs
its function adequately are of utmost importance. 13 The job of the bail
judge, who serves as gatekeeper of pretrial detention, involves prediction
10 The difference between pretrial and "preventive" detention is often confused in contemporary usage. Pretrial detention generally denotes the custody of defendants before trial
as a result of having unaffordably high or no bail assigned at the first appearance before a
judge. "Preventive" detention usually signifies a purposeful detention of a defendant deemed
likely to pose a danger to the public if released pending adjudication, either sub rosa through
the device of setting high cash bail or directly when permitted by statute, as for example in
the District of Columbia. See D.C. CODE ANN §§ 23-1321 to -1332. Although defendants
could also be preventively detained as a result of their perceived risk of flight, this use of the
term preventive detention is rarely encountered. But see K. Feinberg, Promoting Accountability in Making Bail Decisions (February 1982) (paper presented at Harvard University,
Conference on Public Danger, Dangerous Offenders and the Criminal Justice System).
I I In fact, this strongly resembles the perspective of early advocates of bail reform. See,
e.g., D. FREED & P. WALD, supra note 3, at 39-48; R. GOLDFARB, supra note 6, at 32; Ares,
supra note 7, at 88-92; Foote, supra note 2, at 1057.
12 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, TASK FORCE ON
CRIME 11-14 (1981) [hereinafter cited as ABA]; ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME; FINAL REPORT 50-53 (1981) [hereinafter

cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE]; Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionalityof
Preventive Detention, 55 VA. L. REv. 1223 (1969).
13 For a discussion of the equal protection issues raised by the use of pretrial detention, see
J. GOLDKAMP, supra note 6, at 11; Meyer, PretrialDetention, 60 GEo. L.J. 1381 (1972).
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in its most fundamental sense. The judge must assess the likelihood that
defendants will abscond, commit crimes, or harass or intimidate victims
and witnesses if released before trial, 14 and then devise the necessary
restraints from a range of options.' 5 From this perspective, we may view
detained defendants as those deemed by the judges as ineligible for less
restrictive pretrial options-such as ROR (release on recognizance) or
conditional release-and thus as embodying the judges' (or the system's)
prediction of "worst-risks."' 6 Because the goals of bail involve anticipation of possible future conduct, and the resulting use of detention is predictive in nature, questions about prediction have played a major role in
the debate surrounding bail and detention practices. Answers to these
questions will necessarily be derived through use of a framework
designed to evaluate their predictive effectiveness.
Two concerns lie at the core of prediction-related issues in bail and
pretrial detention, although they may likewise apply to other crucial
justice decisions. 1 7 Those concerns are (1) that courts make unwarranted assumptions of guilt; and (2) that courts are unable accurately to
predict defendants' behavior.
A.

UNWARRANTED ASSUMPTIONS OF GUILT

By definition, bail and pretrial detention decisions involve defendants who have been charged with but not convicted of any crime. A
major criticism of the sub rosa use of detention through traditional cash
bail practices (sub rosa because detention is produced through the indi14 It is important to note the longstanding debate over defining the legitimate purposes of
bail. Many have argued that concerns about danger are not constitutionally relevant to the

bail determination and that bail may be used only to assure the appearance of defendants at
trial. For a summary of this argument and its treatment in case law and legislation, see J.
GOLDKAMP supra note 6, at 18.
15 Consideration of a range of options at bail may be alien to most judges who actually

make bail decisions. Generally, if bail is not denied outright, either personal recognizance
release (ROR) or cash bail are the only two options employed. Yet, in theory the options

available to bail decisionmakers are much richer. The landmark legislation from the bail
reform movement of the 1960's, the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152
(1976), outlines a "least restrictive" strategy for federal judges deciding bail, including release
to a third party, release under supervision, restrictions on travel, residence, and associations,
deposit bail, and, at tile restrictive extreme, part-time custody. Except under recent preventive detention amendments, legislation, and proposals, bail in most states cannot be denied
directly except in capital cases "where the proof is evident and the presumption great." See J.
GOLDKAMP, supra note 6, at 55, for a comprehensive analysis of laws in the states governing
the right to bail.
16 This, of course, ignores the extent to which bail and pretrial detention are put to nonlegitimate uses such as punishment. See Landes, supra note 8, at 328; R. FLEMMING, PUNISHMENT BEFORE TRIAL: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF FELONY BAIL PROCESS (1982).
17 For an excellent treatment of prediction issues in criminal justice system-wide, see M.
GOTTFREDSON & D. GoTTFREDSON, DECISIONMAKING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TOWARD THE
RATIONAL EXERCISE OF DISCRETION 7-17 (1980).
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rect device of assigning unaffordable cash bail) and of preventive detention proposals is that bail judges premise the assessment of the
probability of future crime or flight largely on the offense(s) with which
a defendant is currently charged but of which he or she has not yet been
convicted.
Judges may perceive a "pattern" of dangerous behavior, reasoning,
for example, that if a defendant could have been involved in a particularly serious offense, then he or she might be quite likely to become so
involved again. Judges, like many preventive detention supporters, may
also discern such a pattern by combining knowledge of a current alleged
offense with a record of past conviction(s) or arrest(s) for similar
crimes.' 8 Though perhaps logical from the point of view of the decisionmaker making the forecast of future behavior, critics argue that this
approach, which is based upon a priori assumptions about the
defendent's guilt, flies in the face of the perceived due process right to a
presumption of innocence.' 9
B.

INABILITY TO PREDICT ACCURATELY

Critics who argue from a legal perspective that prediction based
upon assumptions of guilt related to a current charge is unconstitutional
may shift to a social science argument to protest that, in any event, prediction of rare human behavior (such as pretrial flight or crime, which
have generally low baseline or incidence rates) is statistically difficult
and, as performed by judges making the bail decisions, is quite likely to
be terrible.2 0 That detention could be the result for some defendants,
then, would be unconscionable. The critics can point to recent research
literature in criminal justice generally, 2 I and in bail specifically 22 which
18 See United States v. Edwards, 43 A.2d 1321 (D.C. App. 198 1), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1024
(1982); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321 to -1332; ABA, supra note 12, at 11-13; ATTORNEY GENERAL's TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 50-53.
19 See Ares, supra note 7, at 69, 88; Ervin, Foreword to PreventiveDetention.-An EmpiricalAnaysis, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 290, 298 (1971); Foote, supra note 2, at 1036, 1038, 1043;
Foote, Crisisin Bail. I, supra note 6 at 963; Foote, Crisisin Bail-I, supra note 6, at 1130, 113536, 1164-65. But see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (presumption of innocence has no
application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before
trial).
20 See generaly, j. MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF
CLINICAL TECHNIQUES (1981) (comprehensive review of issues relating to prediction of
dangerousness).
21 See M. GOTTFREDSON & D. GOTTFREDSON, supra note 17.
22 See, e.g., S. CLARKE, J. FREEMAN & G. KOCH, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BAIL SYSTEMS:
AN ANALYSIS OF FAILURE-TO- APPEAR IN COURT AND REARREST WHILE ON BAIL 2-4 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as S. CLARKE]; J. LOCKE, R. PENN, R. RICK, BUNTEN & G. HARE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS, TECHNICAL NOTE 535, COMPILATION AND USE OF CRIMINAL COURT DATA IN RELATION TO PRE-TRIAL RELEASE OF DEFENDANTS: PILOT STUDY
(1970) [hereinafter cited as J. LOCKE, PILOT STUDY]; J. ROTH & P. WICE, PRETRIAL RE-
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supports the contention that current predictive skills are poor.
Both legal and social science critiques of the predictive abilities of
bail judges focus on the margin of error that results from poor prediction. To successfully ensure the detention of defendants who would actually abscond or commit crimes if released, many defendants who
would never pose such a risk will necesssarily be held. At the same time,
in attempting to foster the release of as many low-risk defendants as
possible, judges also mistakenly permit the release of defendants who
23
turn out to be dangerous or who later abscond.
Recent studies of prediction in pretrial decisionmaking have added
fuel to the debate about the predictive efficacy of bail and detention. In
general, correlates of failure for defendants on pretrial release have been
found, 24 but they have not demonstrated strength in multivariate analyses. Moreover, their overall power to predict failure-to-appear (FTA)
and rearrest among released defendants accurately has been weak.
Moreover, factors found to be related to pretrial failure, however
weakly, have not been found to be those necessarily relied upon by
judges in making bail decisions; rather, factors actually employed in bail
decisions may ignore or contradict those found to be noteworthy in pre25
dictive studies.
The less-than-overwhelming findings concerning the power of bail
predictions aside, it is important to note that virtually all of the studies
may have suffered a significant limitation in the selection of their samples: they studied only defendants achieving pretrial release, thus excluding those who were detained. Although researchers have grown
accustomed to studying released defendants for the same practical reasons that parole predictions are based only on those released and not on
those originally eligible (i.e., a certain proportion of the high-risk cases
remain confined and unavailable for study), this limitation is potentially
important because a sizeable proportion of the total population of defendants may have been ignored. 26 Depending upon the proportion of
defendants typically detained, which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdicLEASE AND MISCONDUCT IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1978); Gottfredson, An Empirical

Analysis of PretrialRelease Decisions, 2 J. CRIM. JUST. 287, 289 (1974); M. Feeley & J. McNaughton, The Pretrial Process in the Sixth Circuit: A Qualitative and Legal Analysis (1974)
(mimeograph).
23 See Angel, Green, Kaufman & Van Loon, Preventive Detention: An EmpiricalAnal sir, 6
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 303-32 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Angel].
24 See, e.g., S. CLARKE, supra note 22, at 20-32; J. LOCKE, PILOT STUDY, supra note 22, at
293-301; Angel, supra note 23, at 309-22;J. ROTH & P. WicE, supra note 22; Gottfredson,supra
note 22, at 293-301; M. Feeley & J. McNaughton, supra note 22.
25 See J. GOLDKAMP, M. GOTTFREDSON & S. MITCHELL- HERZFELD, NATIONAL INSTIA STUDY OF POLICY GUIDELINES (1981)
[hereinafter cited as J. GOLDKAMP, BAIL DECISIONMAKING].
26 See Gottfredson, supra note 22, at 300-01. For a general discussion of methodological

TUTE OF CORRECTIONS, BAIL DECISIONMAKING:
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tion,2 7 and the selectivity of detention practices, it is conceivable that
these studies have produced predictive equations for failure among defendants from whom the most likely candidates for failure have already
been screened out by detention.
Along with the assumptions implied in overcrowding reduction
strategies and provisions for increased use of detention, the predictive
studies fuel further questions about the nature of pretrial detention. If
even statistical prediction is likely to be inherently marginal and it is
known that statistical methods are generally superior to "clinical" methods, then subjective assessments of judges at bail may be poor and the
resulting use of detention may be highly unselective. If pretrial confinement practices were found to differentiate only poorly among criminal
defendants awaiting adjudication, then grave questions concerning the
legitimacy of the institution of pretrial detention would have to be
faced.
The study presented here makes use of several sources of detentionrelated data gathered in Philadelphia to investigate the effectiveness of
pretrial detention. A fundamental question focuses on the extent to
which pretrial detention differentiates among criminal defendants (i.e.,
its selectivity) and the degree to which this selectivity is appropriate and
effective. The analysis involves both empirical characterizations of detainees to assess whether they conform to their presumed status as the
system's (or, more correctly, the bail judges') predictions of "worst-risk"
defendants and testing of these predictions through release and followup of detained defendants. 2 8 We designed the following two empirical
components to address separate aspects of detention and prediction
questions.
L

PretrialDetention in Philadelphiaand a 'Natural" Experinment

In the first component, we addressed questions concerning the relative "selectivity" of pretrial detention empirically through two sets of
data-one, a sample describing the population of defendants detained
issues related to prediction in other areas of criminal justice decisionmaking, including parole,
see M. GOTrFREDSON & D. GOTTFREDSON, supra note 17, at 99-143.
27 See LAZAR INSTITUTE, PRETRIAL RELEASE: AN EVALUATION OF DEFENDANT OUTCOMES AND PROGRAM IMPACT 6 (1981); W. THOMAS, supra note 6, at 37-42.
28 Although Philadelphia may differ from other American jurisdictions in important respects such as the existence of well-developed pretrial services resources, Philadelphia nevertheless was an excellent case study because of its similarities with other major urban
jurisdictions which are struggling with diminishing resources, large case loads, and jail overcrowding. This study was funded in part by the National Institute of Corrections as part of
the work of the Bail Decisionmaking Project through the Criminal Justice Research Center in
Albany, New York, and in part by Temple University. Temple University provided support
for the data collection relating to theJackson defendants.
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in Philadelphia on a single day, and the second, a sample comprised of a
group of defendants selected by court order for emergency release from
detention as a result of overcrowding litigation. Using these data, we
examined questions about the characteristics of those typically detained
in a major urban jurisdiction and drew inferences about the selectivity
of detention practices. Further inferences about the predictive effectiveness of detention in Philadelphia were examined by means of the "natural" experiment brought about by the expedited release of defendants
who would otherwise have remained in detention.
2.

The Utility of Prediclive Classifcation

The second component of the study tested the accuracy of a predictive classification recently developed through study of released Philadelphia defendants. As applied to the specially released defendants, as well
as to the pretrial population overall, this device provided a singular analytic framework resulting in evidence relating to the function of pretrial
detention and its selectivity, as well as to the general utility of predictive
classification in bail and detention.
III.

JACKSON v. HENDRICK AND THE "NATURAL" EXPERIMENT

The three institutions which serve as the functional equivalent of
Philadelphia's urban jail system, Holmesburg, the House of Correction,
and the Detention Center (hereinafter "the Philadelphia prisons"), have
been the source of serious crowding-related difficulties for at least the
last fifteen years. Two of the facilities were constructed near the turn of
the century; the third, the Detention Center, was constructed in 1965 to
help alleviate overcrowded conditions in the City's other institutions.
During the late 1960's, the Philadelphia prisons gained national notoriety as a result of an investigation of sexual violence occurring within
the institutions and in sheriffs' vans. 29 Riots in the 1970's and the murder of prison administrators were followed by two class actions brought
on behalf of inmates protesting conditions within the prisons. In Bgyant
v. Hendrick,30 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the existence of
"cruel and unusual" conditions, and, inJackson v. Hendrick,31 the Court
of Common Pleas set forth procedures designed to remedy conditions
within the substandard facilities. The Jackson suit, litigated for more
29 See Davis, Report on Sexual Assaults in the Philadelphia Prison System and Shernfs' Vans,
TRANSACTION 8 (1968).
30 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971).
31 No. 71-2437 (Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Feb. 1971); see alsoJackson, No. 712437 (Mar. 1981) (stipulation and agreement);Jackson,No. 71-2437 (Feb. 1977) (same). For a
description of problems leading up to the class action, see Rudovsky, Prison Reform in Philadelphia, 38 SHINGLE 85 (1975).
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than a decade at the time of this writing, has produced consent decrees
mandating procedures for improvements in physical conditions, programs, and resources available to the individuals held in the Philadelphia prisons. A theme running throughout these actions has been
crowding; one decree stipulated a population limit of 2,200 inmates, although at the time of this study the population was approaching 3,000
32
and still growing.
Although the Philadelphia institutions hold inmates in diverse
statuses as do other urban jails, one of theJackson court-ordered population reduction measures was aimed at bail-held detainees because a substantial portion of the total population of the prisons are detained
awaiting trial. 33 Premised on a belief that a major share of the pretrial
population consisted of defendants who were not seriously charged, had
good community ties, were reasonably good risks, and were held principally because they were unable to afford low amounts of bail, theJackson court ordered prompt review for release of all defendants held on
$1,500 bail (only $150 bail in actual ten percent terms) 34 or less, with
particular priority assigned to those confined for the longest periods
awaiting trial. The rationale for this emergency approach was simple
and tantamount to a "longest-in and lowest-bail" approach to expedited
release. This resulted in what, from the perspective of social science research, might be viewed as a "natural" experiment. The court remedy
sought to reasonably delineate and to grant belated release to the safest,
lowest-risk defendants in the jail, those who but for a few dollars would
35
have been able to secure pretrial release in any event.
The resulting release of defendants who were-and would have re32 By December 1981, the population had reached 3,700, or 1,500 inmates over capacity.
33 Each of the Philadelphia prisons housed some pretrial detainees. According to an annual report from 1980, pretrial detention accounted for 88% of the population of the Detention Center, 78% of the inmates at Holmesburg and about 50% of those in the House of
Detention. See PHILADELPHIA DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PHILADELPHIA PRISONS (1980).
34 Jackson, No. 71-2437 at 3. Under Philadelphia's "deposit" bail program, the bondsman
has been displaced and the defendant is able to secure release by posting 10% of the actual
full bail amount with the court. Upon successful completion of the required proceedings, the
deposit is returned to the defendant, minus a small service charge. See J. GOLDKAMP, supra
note 6, at 111-35. See generally W. THOMAS, supra note 6, at 188.
35 It is important to point out that the soundness of theJackson court's method in selecting
the most appropriate detainees for expedited release rests heavily on the assumption that the
relative risk of defendants is accurately indicated by the amount of bail the court assigns to
them. There is a growing body of research literature that would seriously call into question
such an assumption. See J. GOLDKAMP, supra note 6; J. GOLDKAMP, BAIL DEcISIONMAKING,
supra note 25; J. GOLDKAMP & M. GOTTFREDSON, JUDICIAL DECISION GUIDELINES FOR
BAIL: THE PHILADELPHIA EXPERIMENT (1983); J. ROTH & P. WIcE, supra note 22; J.
Goldkamp, Bail Decisionmaking and the Role of Pretrial Detention in American Justice
(Ph.D. dissertation 1977).
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mained-detained provided an important opportunity to gather evidence relating to the nature of pretrial detention. Although a full
"natural" experiment might have involved study and follow-up of release of the total population of pretrial detained, 36 we determined that
follow-up of defendants implicitly designated by court order as the most
releasable (i.e., the lowest-risk) would shed light on the highly questioned "dividing-line" between release and detention. If the court-selected, most releasable of Philadelphia detainees differed little from
other released defendants, then serious questions could be raised about
the apparent arbitrariness of the assignment of detention among defendants. If, for example, the "specially" released defendants resembled the
"normally" released defendants, then either they never should have
been confined pending adjudication in the first place, or the "normally"
released defendants ought to have been confined as well. On the other
hand, if they differed greatly from those "normally" released, and in
follow-up it was shown that they performed considerably more poorly,
one could conclude that the dividing line between release and detention
before trial, creating two classes of accused, was based on a tangible and
relevant distinction and that the institution of detention appeared, in
Philadelphia at least, to be appropriately selective.
A.

METHOD:

DETENTION, RELEASE, AND FOLLOW-UP

As noted above, the data collected were (1) descriptive of the pretrial population in the Philadelphia prisons in general, and (2) related to
the defendants ordered released by theJackson court. Furthermore, we
also used descriptive findings from an earlier study done in Philadelphia 3 7 for purposes of comparison.
To reflect the pretrial population generally, we drew a random
sample (n = 463) of defendants detained in the prisons prior to trial on a
"typical" day (November 13, 1980).38 To study the specially released
36 An excellent example of a "natural" experiment is described in H. STEADMAN & J.
COCOZZA, CAREERS OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE 46-54 (1974). In the Steadman and
Cocozza study, the researchers took advantage of the Supreme Court's decision in Baxstrom

v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), which mandated the release of persons held in a New York
institution for the criminally insane to civil mental facilities. This court-ordered release allowed the researchers to test assumptions about persons confined as criminally insane in comparison with those civilly determined to be insane, particularly assumptions about their
dangerousness. In this respect, though on a more modest scale, the current study capitalizes
on a similar circumstance to examine assumptions about those held in pretrial detention in

Philadelphia.
37 J. GOLDKAMP, supra note 6; J. Goldkamp, supra note 35; see also J. GOLDKAMP, BAIL
DECISIONMAKING, supra note 25.
38 The total population of pretrial detained on that day was 1,452 defendants. This sampling approach, focusing on a single day, follows the approach adopted by LEAA in surveying inmates of jails across the United States. The cross-sectional approach permits
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defendants, we collected data on all defendants (n = 462) named in the
first five lists produced by theJackson court for expedited release during
the late summer and fall of 1979. 3 9 We then followed defendants released under theJackson procedures for a period of ninety days to record
their performance while on pretrial release.
In order to address questions relating to the nature of pretrial detention in more general terms, the sample reflecting the detained overall
is examined first. The descriptive findings are outlined here because of
the important background they provide.
B.

DEFENDANTS DETAINED IN THE PHILADELPHIA PRISONS

On November 13, 1980, approximately 54% of all persons confined
in the prisons (n = 2,695) were confined for bail-related reasons. (See
Figure 1). We took a 17% random sample (n = 463) of these 1,452 detainees to produce estimates of the pretrial population overall. 40 Briefly,
the Philadelphia detainees exhibited the following characteristics.
1. Demographics. Defendants detained in the Philadelphia prisons
were predominantly young (58% were twenty-five years old or younger),
single (73% had never married), black (80% were black, 17% white, 3%
other ethnicities), male (94%), and unemployed (79%). About one-third
were on public assistance at the time of their arrests.
2. Criminalcharge. Figure 2 arrays the detained defendants according to the seriousness of the offenses with which they were charged. Using Pennsylvania's former six-grade felony-misdemeanor classification, 4 1
we found that most were charged with serious offenses: 85% were
charged with felonies; 61% were charged with first degree felonies. In
addition, more than half (56%) were charged with crimes against the
person. Approximately 22% were charged with crimes involving injury
to the victim (9% minor injury, 6% serious, 7% resulting in death).
[Figure 1 about here]
characterization of the overall population as it might typically be faced "on a given day." See
LEAA, ADvANcE REPORT, supra note 5, at 11-12. See generall LEAA, CENSUS, supra note 5.
39 The court ruled inJackson
that by July 1, 1977, the defendants shall develop and implement an adminstrative
mechanism to maintain the population in the 3 institutions at no greater than the rated
level. If the population exceeds this level, persons who are held in default of S1,500 bail
or less, starting with those who have been detained for the longest period of time, shall be
released on their own recognizance by the Court ....
No. 71-2437 at 3 (Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Feb. 21, 1977). More than five lists
were ultimately produced; in fact, the Jackson listing procedure continued until a subsequent
consent decree changed the order to include defendants held on $3,000 or less. The Jackson
reviews continue at the time of this writing.
40 Because of standard error, estimates may vary from true population values of + 2% to
3%.
41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 106 (Purdon 1983).
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FIGURE 1
OVERVIEW OF POPULATION OF PHILADELPHIA PRISONS ON
A GIVEN DAYa
Held for U.S. Marshals
1% (N - 27)
Prisoners temporarily held
for Conmonwea th

uveniles certified as adults
1% (N 30)

Alleged probation and
parole
10% (Nviolators
272)

Convicted persons.....
awaiting sentencing
IV. (N-276)
Defendants detained on
bail, no bail, or beach
54% (N !

1,452)

Sentenced
20% (N - 532)

a

On November 13, 1980, the population of Philadelphia prisons totalled
2,695 persons.

3. Prior record. Only 23% had not been arrested within the past
three years. Nineteen percent had been arrested once, and 58% had
been arrested two or more times. Approximately 28% had been arrested
four or more times during that period. Sixty-two percent had prior arrests for crimes against the person, 51% for property crimes, 32% for
drug offenses, and 47% for weapons offenses.
Only 31% had no prior convictions; 21% had one prior conviction;
48% had two or more. Thirty-nine percent had prior convictions for
crimes against the person, 16% had prior drug convictions, and 25% had
prior weapons convictions. Overall, 56% of those detained on a single
day had prior felony convictions.
4. Other indicators of prior involvement with the criminaljistice system.
Twenty percent had warrants or detainers outstanding, and 40% had
other charges pending at the time of their arrest on the current alleged
offense. More than half of all detainees had prior willful FTAs (failuresto-appear in court): 16% had one prior willful FTA; 36% had two or
more.
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FIGURE 2
SERIOUSNESS OF CHARGES OF DETAINED DEFENDANTS IN
PHILADELPHIA PRISONS ON NOVEMBER 13, 1980: FELONY MISDEMEANOR GRADINGS
PERCENT

61

13

3

LOW

MISDEMEANOR

I

i3

2
-FELONY

1
High

Total N = 463

5. Length of confinement. Figure 3 depicts the length of time already
spent in detention by defendants sampled on November 13, 1980. Approximately 3% had been in jail for one day or less, another 9% had
been confined from 2 to 7 days, 8% were in their second week (between 8
and 14 days), 17% were in their third or fourth week of confinement.
Approximately 62% of all detainees had been confined for more than
one month; 31% had been confined for more than three months.
6. Bail holding defendants in detention. Figure 4 shows the amount of
bail on which Philadelphia detainees were held: 6% of defendants were
held on amounts between $300 and $500; 11% were held on amounts
between $800 and $1,000; 5% were held on $1,500; 13% were held on
amounts between $2,500 and $3,000; 7% were held on amounts between
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$3,500 and $4,500; 13% were held on $5,000; 5% were held on between
$5,300 and $9,500 bail; 10% were held on $10,000; 21% were held on
amounts higher than $10,000. The court completely denied bail to 7%
42
of the defendants.

FIGURE 3
LENGTH OF PRETRIAL CONFINEMENT FOR DEFENDANTS IN
PHILADELPHIA PRISONS ON NOVEMBER

13, 1980

PERCENT

1 day

2-7
days

8-14
days

15-30
days

31

31

31-90
days

Over 91
days

LENGTH OF PRETRIAL CONFINEMENT

Total N = 463

42 These amounts reflect the full amount theoretically owed to the court should a defendant abscond and then be apprehended. In practice, because of Philadelphia's ten percent
plan, defendants could gain release by paying only 10% of those amounts. Se supra note 34.
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FIGURE 4
AMOUNTS OF BAIL HOLDING PHILADELPHIA DETAINEES ON
NOVEMBER 13, 1980
PERCENT
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Of course, the composition of the jail population in Philadelphia
fluctuates from day to day and month to month. Nevertheless, it seems
reasonable to view these findings as generally indicative of the pretrial
population on a given day.
In themselves, these descriptive findings are insufficient to draw definitive conclusions; nevertheless, the general picture of the pretrial detained that emerges does not on its face confirm assumptions that
detention is unselective or that many non-seriously charged, first-time,
low-risk defendants are held. Interestingly, a sizeable portion of the
population was confined on relatively low bail; an estimated 22% were
held on $1,500 bail-only $150 in 10% terms-or less (this portion of
the population became the target of the Jackson release measures). On
the whole, and without the benefit of comparison with released defendants, the characteristics of the population of pretrial detainees suggest a
notable degree of selectivity in the institution of pretrial detention.
C.

DETAINED DEFENDANTS DESIGNATED FOR RELEASE
UNDER JACKSON

In the summer of 1979, theJackson court ordered that detainees
held on $1,500 or less be reviewed immediately for expedited release. As
a result, periodic lists of detained defendants were produced. This study
included all defendants named on the first five lists, although the listing
process continued beyond that number. It was reasoned that study of a
"slice" of the overall pretrial population of the prisons implicitly viewed
as the most releasable of detained defendants by theJackson court would
allow inferences to be drawn about the selectivity of pretrial detention,
the "dividing line" between release and detention, and the predictive
effectiveness of detention in one jurisdiction. Following is a summary of
the attributes of theJackson defendants designated for expedited release
from pretrial detention.
1. Demographics. The Jackson defendants exhibited the demographic attributes shared by the pretrial population as a whole reported
above.
2. Current charge. Remarkably, 62% were being held on felony
charges, and 29% were held for first degree felony charges. More specifically, 2% were held for serious crimes against the person, 43 9% were held
for robbery, 21% were held for burglary, and 21% were held for aggravated asssult. Overall, 32% of those designated for expedited release
underJackson were charged with crimes against the person.
43 This category of offenses includes murder, rape, manslaughter, aggravated assault, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, and kidnapping. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2301,
2501-2504, 2702, 2901, 3101 (Purdon 1983).
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3. Prior record. Among the Jackson-designated most releasable defendants, only 26% had no record of prior arrest within the last three
years; 24% had one, and 50% had more than one arrest. Fifty percent
had prior arrests against the person; 32% had recent prior arrests for
weapons offenses.
More than half (57%) had prior convictions; 39% had two or more
prior convictions. Twenty-six percent had convictions for crimes against
the person, 11% had drug convictions, and 43% had convictions for
felonies.
4. Pending charges. If one test of the likelihood that a defendant
might commit a crime while on pretrial release is whether the current
arrest occurred while on release pending disposition of previous charges,
then the fact that about one-third of Jackson designees had pending
charges is striking: 11% had more than one case pending.
5. Prior willful FTAs. Equally striking is the finding that 45% of
Jackson defendants had prior willful FTAs; 25% had recorded two or
more prior willful FTAs. Most astonishing, 20% of the defendants designated for release underJackson were in jail after having failed, either
through FTA or rearrest, on pretrial release.
Inferences about the selectivity of pretrial detention can best be
made by contrasting detained defendants with Philadelphia defendants
generally and then comparing the profiles of each of these with theJackson special releases. Table 1 compares several of the salient characteristics of Philadelphia 'detainees and Jackson defendants with
characteristics of the overall Philadelphia defendant population obtained in a study conducted in 1975. 44 Some limitations in the data
should be acknowledged, such as possible sampling errors in the sample
of Philadelphia detainees (estimated at no more than + two to three
percentage points) and the fact that the figures from the 1975 study are
also subject to very slight error 45 around the estimates given. In addition, the three sets of data were not drawn at the same time and thus
may be subject to qualitative fluctuations associated with the passage of
time. These qualifications aside, a contrast of the three studies generate
very valuable findings.
Using the 1975 sample of all Philadelphia defendants entering the
system 46 prior to selection for detention or release as a baseline, we
44 See J. GOLDKAMP, supra note 6, at 126.
45 For a description of the methodology employed in the 1975-1977 study of Philadelphia

defendants, see id. at 111-35.
46 "All" defendants were defined as including only those continuing forward into the
criminal process after first appearance. Thus, certain cases, such as immediate dismissals and
fugitive warrants, were not included in the sample. See id.
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learned the following about the characteristics of detainees in general,
and theJackson defendants, in particular (see Table 1).
1. Current charge. Roughly 22% of all Philadelphia defendants entering the system were charged with felonies. Nearly four times that
proportion of detainees and nearly three times the Jackson defendants
were so charged.
2. Priorfelony convictions. Approximately 25% of the total number
of defendants who entered the system in Philadelphia had records of
prior felony convictions. More than two times as many detainees and
almost twice that proportion ofjackson defendants showed such prior
records.
3. Prior FTAs. Roughly 14% of the total number of defendants
had prior willful FTAs. Almost four times that proportion of Philadelphia detainees in Philadelphia prisons had prior willful FTAs, and more
than three times that proportion of Jackson defendants had previously
absconded.
4. Pending charges. Approximately 8% of Philadelphia defendants
entering the process in late 1975 on a current charge had been on pretrial release for a former, pending charge; thus, they had "failed" on
release as a result of the current offense. Five times that proportion of
all detainees and four times that proportion ofJackson defendants similarly had pending charges at the time of their current offenses.
The comparison in Table 1 removes all doubt about whether pretrial detention is used selectively; indeed, there is evidence that a substantial screening of defendants occurs. Moreover, these findings create
inferences about the dividing line between release and detention. If the
Jackson order applied to the most releasable of detainees in the Philadelphia prisons during the period studied, the implications are clear: the
Jackson defendants also possessed the attributes of central concern (criminal charge, prior record, prior FTA and pending charges) at several
times greater than the averages for Philadelphia defendants generally,
although at a rate slightly less than detainees overall. Even if theJackson
group represented the least-releasable segment of the pretrial population, one could infer that pretrial detention functions selectively in
choosing between defendants who are released and those who are detained, given the greatest differences between thejackson detainees and
defendants overall.
D.

RELEASE AND FOLLOW-UP OF THE JACKSON DEFENDANTS

The first five lists compiled under theJackson $1,500 bail rule designated 462 defendants for expedited release from pretrial confinement,
but by the time the lists were fully processed only 313 or 68% of those
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named were actually released. Detainees not released had either
progressed through the judicial process to disposition or were held for
other reasons, such as detainers or probation violations that were not
evident when the lists were produced. Defendants released subsequent
to their inclusion on theJackson lists were followed for a period of ninety
days. Of theJackson defendants achieving release, 42% recorded willful
FTAs from court at least once. Twenty-eight percent were arrested for
crimes occurring during their period of pretrial release. Of these, approximately 24% were for serious crimes against the person (murder,
rape, robbery, aggravated assault), 23% were for serious property crimes,
5% for weapons crimes.
By using the previous study of all Philadelphia defendants as a
baseline, we were able to confirm the perception that these rates of failure are high.4 7 Approximately 76% of the cohort of an estimated 8,311
defendants were released within one day of their bail decisions. Approximately 12% of all released Philadelphia defendants in that representative cohort recorded willful FTAs and 17% were rearrested for crimes
during a follow-up period of 120 days. 48 Thus, defendants released
through theJackson court-ordered selection of the "most releasable" of
detainees absconded at 3.5 times and were rearrested at roughly 2.3
times the Philadelphia average.
The implications of these results for the use of detention in a general sense are straightforward: not only is detention in Philadelphia selective, but the dividing line between released defendants and the "most
releasable" detained defendants appears to have predictive merit. The
assumption that a sizeable proportion of detained defendants, as exemplified in this study by theJackson defendants, poses no more serious risk
of flight or crime than that posed by released defendants generally is not
supported. If we view detainees generally, and theJackson detainees in
particular, as the system's prediction of poor risks, theJackson findings
reveal predictive merit.
47 See

J.

GoLDKAmP, BAIL DEcISIONMAKING, sufira note 25, at Appendix H;

J.

GOLDKAMp, supra note 6.

48 See J. GOLDKAMP, BAIL DEcISIONMAKING, supra note 25, at Appendix H. Note that
the follow-up period-l120 days-for the baseline sample is longer than that which was employed for thejackson follow-up. Some observers of bail contend that failure rate is a function
of the length of time at risk (on pretrial release). See, e.g., S. CLARKE, supra note 22, at 18.
Thus, it would be hypothesized that, other factors being comparable, a sample employing a
longer follow-up period would show a somewhat higher rate of failure. Therefore, the findings from this comparison become more striking when the longer follow-up period for the
baseline sample is acknowledged.
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VIEWING DETENTION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A
PREDICTION INSTRUMENT

The finding that pretrial detention may effectively select for confinement defendants who are significantly higher risks than those released underscores the problem raised in studies of prediction in pretrial
release. As noted above, these studies have attempted to predict failureto-appear and rearrest among various samples of released defendants.
Their results, though potentially very valuable to the improvement of
bail decisionmaking, generally have been weak. The exclusion of detained defendants was viewed as a serious limitation 49 to the extent that
those defendants might differ from released defendants. That is, if detained defendants were generally more dangerous or more likely to fail
to appear, the weakness of these predictive analyses could be traced in
part to the fact that they were derived from the study of failure among
populations of defendants generally unlikely to fail.
As a final component to the current study, we attempted to assess
the validity of release-based predictive approaches by applying a predictive classification instrument recently developed in a study of released
defendants 50 to the Jackson defendants who, but for the court-ordered
special release procedures, would have remained in detention. We reasoned that application of the prediction instrument to the Jackson defendants would test the validity of a bail prediction instrument, which
was based on a limited sample of defendants, only those achieving release, and would thereby shed light on the likely utility of such instruments for bail decisionmaking. Moreover, we determined that
application of the prediction instrument here would allow further inferences to be drawn concerning the attributes of theJackson "most releasable" detainees. Would the use of such a predictive classification
confirm or rebut inferences about the dividing line between released and
detained defendants? Would the prediction instrument accurately predict the relative rates of failure amongJackson releases?
As part of the work of the Bail Decisionmaking Project in Philadelphia,51 we conducted a number of empirical analyses of failure-to-appear and rearrest among Philadelphia defendants. 52 A final prediction
J. GOLDKAMP, supra note 6, at 77-108; Gottfredson, supra note 22, at 300.
50 See generally J. GOLDKAMP, BAIL DECISIONMAKING, supra note 25.

49 See

51 The Bail Decisionmaking Project was funded initially by a grant from the National
Institute of Corrections (NIC) to the Criminal Justice Research Center to study the feasibility
of a guidelines approach to bail in Philadelphia. In a subsequent experimental implementation stage, NIC was joined by the National Institute of Justice. See J. GOLDKAMP & M.
GOTrFREDSON, supira note 35. J. GOLDKAMP, BAIL DECISONMAKING, supra note 25.
52 Set J. GOLDKAMP, BAIL DECISIONMAKING, supra note 25, at 81-84, Appendices G & H.
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instrument, which sought to predict pretrial failure generally,53 was validated on an independent sample representative of Philadelphia defendants who were processed into the judicial system and who subsequently

TABLE 2
PARAMETERS AND CORRESPONDING POINTSa FOR FINAL MODIFIED
LOGIT MODEL FITTED TO FAILURE ON RELEASE FOR
CONSTRUCTION SAMPLE DATAb
Variable
Intercept
Over 44
Yes
Phone
Yes
Prior FTAs
1
2 or more
Pending charges
I or more
Arrests within the last three years
1
2
3 or more
Serious personal/sex offense
Yes
Miscellaneous offense

Yes
Property offense
Yes
Over 44 is yes and prior FTAs is
1
2 or more
Serious personal/sex offense is
yes and arrests is
1
2
3 or more
a
b

Parameter

Points

-0.54

-

4

-0.76

-

5

-0.36

-

2

0.25
0.50

2
3

0.64

4

0.17
0.34
0.51

1
2
3

-2.03

-14

-0.89

- 6

-0.48

-

3

0.69
1.38

5
9

0.23
0.46
0.69

2
3
5

Points were derived by dividing by .15.
Source: J. GOLDKAMP, BAIL DECISIONMAKING, supra note 25.

53 Failure among released defendants refers to either FTA or rearrest.
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secured release. 54 The final instrument included the following factors
(see Table 2): type of charged offense, recent arrests pending charges,
prior willful FTAs, age, telephone, and combination of charge and arrests, age, and FTAs.55
1. Classfication of the Jackson Defendants According to Risk
The predictive scheme described above produces five classes of deFIGURE 5
RISK CLASSIFICATION OF JACKSON DEFENDANTS DESIGNATED FOR
SPECIAL RELEASE

PERCENT

50
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MM
PROBABILITY OF FAILURE ON PRETRIAL RELEASE

Low

0 High

Total N = 457
Missing cases = 69
54 For a discussion of the validation procedures, see J. GOLDKAMP, BAIL DECISIONMAK-

supra note 25, at Appendix H.
55 As noted above, see supra text accompanying note 54, this predictive classification was
validated on an independent sample of Philadelphia defendants. See also J. Goldkamp, supra
ING,

note 35, at 355-65.
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fendants based on the relative likelihood of pretrial failure. As depicted
in Table 3, in the validation sample on which the final version of the
instrument was based, defendants classified in Group 1 failed on release
(through FTA or rearrest) 12% of the time; those in Group 2 failed 18%
of the time; Group 3 defendants failed 23% of the time; 38% in Group 4
failed; and in Group 5 defendants failed 54% of the time. These rates of
failure reflect the probability that other defendants classified as falling
within a given group would fail to appear in court and/or be rearrested
for a new crime during pretrial release.
Figure 5 arrays defendants designated for special release by the
Jackson $1,500 bail rule according to their classification of risk. Had this
tool been available before the Jackson court release procedures began,
the court would not have been reassured: 47% of theJackson-named defendants would have been in the highest risk category (Group 5); another 32% percent would have been ranked as second highest risk (in
Group 4).56 Thus, together, 79% would have shown the highest
probabilities of failure during a period of pretrial release. On the other
hand, 8% would have been classified as lowest risk, 4% falling into
Group 1 and 4% into Group 2. Figure 6 shows roughly the same classification results forJackson defendants actually set free. 57 Using this classification approach, the court would have predicted a rate of failure
among the soon-to-be-released Jackson defendants of approximately
42%.
These findings further undermine the view that the dividing line
between release and detention is arbitrary: theJackson court's designation of the most releasable defendants actually included a discouragingly high proportion of high-risk detainees. In fact, contrasted with the
expected distribution among Philadelphia defendants (see Table 3), the
Jackson defendants were disproportionately high risk.
The strength of this predictive classification approach is supported
by findings from the follow-up study of Jackson defendants. Figure 7
first contrasts the rates of failure, either through FTA or rearrest, for
Jackson defendants with the rates for the representative sample of Philadelphia defendants. The darkened horizontal bar shows that 53% of the
Jackson defendants either absconded or were rearrested within ninety
56 The missing numbers indicated in the figures for Jackson defendants resulted from the
lack of relevant information in certain cases-the partial result of a retrospective data collection procedure.
57 As noted above, some of the defendants designated for expedited release under the
Jackson procedures were not released, either as a result of other factors that were at first not
apparent or because their cases reached disposition through dismissal, adjudication, or sentencing shortly after the lists were produced. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
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FIGURE 6

RISK CLASSIFICATION OF JCKSON DEFENDANTS ACHIEVING
RELEASE
PERCENT
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Total N = 313
Missing cases = 40

days compared to 26% of a representative sample of Philadelphia defendants overall. 58 In addition, however, this Figure documents support
for the predictive classification: the instrument ranked defendants well
according to their relative probabilities of failure. With the exception
thatJackson defendants in Groups 2 and 3 failed at similar rates, Group
58 It should be recalled again that the baseline sample employed a 120-day follow-up. See
supra note 46.

1582

JOHNS GOLDKAMP

[Vol. 74

FIGURE 7
FAILURE RATESa OF JAcKSON DEFENDANTS ACHIEVING RELEASE
DURING 90 DAY FOLLOWUPb

PERCENT

RISK CLASSIFICATION

Low

P Hil

ilRate of failure for Jackson defendants overall (53 percent)
EDRate of failure for Philadelphia defendants overall (26 percent)
EEBExpected probability of failure
E-Actual rate of failure
Total N = 237
Missing cases = 76
a

b

Failure is recorded for either a failure to appear in court or arrest for new
crime during pretrial release.
These data reflect defendants named on the first five lists forJackson hearings beginning in August 1979. Defendants achieving release were not
necessarily released as a result ofJackson.
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1 defendants failed less than those in higher groups and defendants classified into Groups 4 and 5 failed at the highest rates. Thus, the prediction instrument developed through analysis of released defendants
ranked detained defendants according to the relative probability of failure on pretrial release reasonably well.
Remarkably, Figure 7 further shows that the prediction scheme underpredicts rates of failure. Based on the validation sample, 59 defendants classified within Group 1 could be expected to fail on release about
12% of the time;Jackson defendants failed 20% of the time. The classification also underpredicted failure for Group 3 defendants by 10%. Although the prediction scheme based on the performance of released
defendants would have projected a 38% failure rate among Group 4
Jackson defendants, 57% failed. Although a 54% failure rate was projected for Group 5 Jackson defendants, 69% actually failed during pretrial release.
Thus, use of the prediction instrument would have predicted that
theJackson court's releasees could be expected to fail in approximately
42% of the cases-a striking contrast to an expected rate of failure
among all Philadelphia defendants of about 25%. In fact, however,
their performance was notably worse: 53% failed on pretrial release, 11%
more than predicted.
2.

Classiftation of All Detainees According to Risk

An important implication of the application of the classification instrument to Jackson defendants is that predictive studies in bail have
been weak in part because they have had to develop predictors using
samples that under-represented likely absconders and pretrial "recidivists." If the application of the previously developed predictive classification instrument to theJackson detainees validates to a certain extent
the strength and utility of that instrument, then it commends its use to
the further evaluation of pretrial detention as well.
Figure 8 extends the analysis to the sample of the total population
of defendants detained in the Philadelphia prisons on a single day.
When all detainees are classified using this risk assessment instrument,
the view that pretrial detention may be quite appropriately selective in
predictive terms is further underscored: more than half (56%) of all detainees on a single day possessed attributes falling into Group 5, the
highest risk category. Another one-quarter (24%) fell into Group 4.
59 The prediction equation was first developed on a sample that did not reflect Philadelphia defendants overall, but was designed to permit examination of judicial disparity in bail
decisions. It was, however, validated on an independent representative sample from the earlier Goldkamp study. See J. GOLDKAMP, BAIL DEcISIONMAKING, supra note 25, at Appendix
H.
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FIGURE 8
RISK CLASSIFICATION OF DEFENDANTS DETAINED IN PHILADELPHIA

PRISONS ON NOVEMBER 13, 1980
PERCENT
70 -

1

2

3

4

5

PROBABILITY OF FAILURE ON PRETRIAL RELEASE

0 High
Total N = 463
Missing cases = 59

Thus, on any given day, approximately 80% of all detainees could be
classified as high or very high risk.
These findings should not be allowed to overshadow the following:
8% of those confined in pretrial detention were lowest-risk; in other
words, 8% were very unlikely ever to abscond or be rearrested for crime
during pretrial release. An additional 5% were in Group 2, nearly as
low-risk as detainees classified in Group 1.
These last findings have important implications, for, if risk alone is
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considered, an estimated 13% of the pretrial population or 7% of the
entire population of the prisons could be considered immediate prospects for unconditional release. On November 13, 1980, that would
have amounted to between 175 and 200 detainees, approximately 40%
of the margin of overcrowding.
IV.

EVALUATING THE PRACTICE OF PRETRIAL DETENTION: FUTURE
DIRECTIONS

Underlying debates about the impact of pretrial detention in jail
overcrowding and proposals for increased use of "preventive" detention
are assumptions about the current uses of detention and its effectiveness
in selectively confining the worst risks among defendants. Implicit in
both controversies are criticisms that pretrial detention in the United
States today is not doing its job.
In attempting to "solve" the overcrowding problem, commentators
often assume that chaotic bail practices produce detention populations
which needlessly include a substantial number of defendants. This view
echoes the cries of early bail reformers that jails were filled with poor
defendants who were not cliarged with serious offenses, had little or no
prior criminal history, and had reasonable ties to the community as
60
well.
Just as overcrowding crises in many American jurisdictions have
brought jails once again to the forefront of public scrutiny, proposals for
extending the use of pretrial detention-as a counterpoint to movements
to reduce jail populations-are being received with increasing favor by
the public and justice officials alike. Generally, the various proposals
focus on defendants with serious criminal charges and prior records of
convictions for serious or violent crimes. 6 1 Regardless of whether these
kinds of criteria have been statistically related to risk of flight or crime
before trial, 62 proponents assume that they are appropriate standards to
govern the use of pretrial detention and, judging from the impetus behind these proposals, they assume that pretrial detention does not operate effectively in current practice, or at least not along the lines
envisaged in the legislation. In fact, they argue that, all too often, dangerous defendants are released to commit further crimes or to harass
victims and witnesses-again, regardless of what empirical studies on
60 See, e.g., Ares, Bail and the Indigent Accused, 8 CRIME & DELINQ. 12, 15, (1962); Ares,
supra note 7, at 89; COMM. ON POvERTY, supra note 7, at 58, 69, 75, 77; Note, Pre-TrialDetenlion in the New York Ciy Jails, 7 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 350 (1971).
61 Compare MICH. CONST. art I., §§ 15-16 and NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9 with D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 23-1321 to -1332 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
62 For a comprehensive treatment of this question, see Angel, supra note 23, at 323-32.
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the matter have shown. 63
The conclusions drawn from Philadelphia data call in to question
the emerging "conventional wisdoms" relating to the causes of overcrowding and the inability of pretrial detention to restrain defendants.
Although these data do not indicate that no nonseriously charged or
low-risk defendants are inappropriately held or that no dangerous defendants somehow gain their freedom to prey upon the public before
trial, they do strongly suggest the following points.
First, pretrial detention-at least in the Philadelphia case studyappears to operate selectively and does not incarcerate defendants randomly. The descriptive findings from the study of the overall detention
population and from the "natural experiment" demonstrate that detained defendants differ notably from the "average" Philadelphia defendant entering the criminal process: they are charged with more
serious crimes, they have lengthy records of prior arrests and conviction,
and they exhibit lengthy histories of flight from court and arrest for
crimes committed during previous periods of pretrial release.
Second, if pretrial detention can best be understood as the system's
prediction of "worst-risk" defendants, i.e., those most likely to flee the
jurisdiction or to commit new crimes if granted pretrial release, then
detention may be performing better as a predictor than critics have suspected-again, at least in the city of Philadelphia. Follow-up of the
Jackson-released defendants, who were viewed as the "most releasable"
of detainees, and the application of the predictive classification instrument to them and to the detention population overall suggests that detainees Will perform worse as a group than "normally" released
Philadelphia defendants.
At the same time, it is important to emphasize firmly the limitations of these conclusions. That pretrial detention operates to some
measurable extent as it is expected to do is reasssuring mainly to the
extent that the purely arbitrary "chaos" model of criminal processing
can be rejected. To conclude that pretrial detention is at a minimum
selective and not chaotic-at least in Philadelphia-begs the question of
how selectively detention should be allocated among defendants.
Should the standard for evaluating pretrial detention be that a substantial majority or virtually all of those held must be classified as "very
high risk?"
Any standard for evaluation of the selectivity of the pretrial deten63 In fact, relatively low rates of failure on pretrial release are reported in jurisdictions
around the country. Especially rare are rearrests of released defendants for serious crimes
against the person. See M. Gottfredson, supra note 22, at 297-301; LAZAR INSTITUTE, supra
note 27, at 20; W. THOMAS, supra note 6, at 234-44; Angel, supra note 23, at 323-24. See
generally J. LocKE, PILOT STUDY, supra note 22.
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tion population not only must focus on questions of its composition (e.g.,
to establish an accepted minimum level of high risk detainees) but, more
fundamentally, must establish the criteria to be invoked in classifying
individuals as "low" or "high" risk. Arguably, the criteria should relate
demonstrably to the outcomes of concern in the bail decision, such as
risk of flight or pretrial crime, and, furthermore, be based on an actuarial classification scheme, such as the one developed in the Philadelphia
study. An alternative approach, based on factors merely assumed or
believed to be logically related to the minimization of FTAs and rearrests by defendants awaiting trial, has been taken in various preventive
detention legislative schemes-e.g., the new laws in California, Ne64
braska or Michigan.
It is one thing to argue, as this Article does, that a large share of the
detention population appears to be "very high risk" and therefore appears not randomly confined as observers of bail practices might have
believed. It is quite another-and a major jump in logic-to conclude
that detention should be meted out on the basis of falling into the most
undesirable categories of a classification scheme measuring "very high
risk" or based on other factors, such as criminal charges or prior record,
established in current laws. Setting aside the controversial nature of
such assumptions, 6 5 however, even if one accepts that being defined as
"very high risk" or very "dangerous" somehow overcomes the presumption that defendants should be granted pretrial release, 66 the fact that a
sizeable minority of the Philadelphia detention population did not fall
into such categories should be cause for alarm. If the former group
(high risk defendants) represents an appropriate use of detention, then
64 Compare CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 12 with MICH. CONsT. art. I, §§ 15-16 and NEB. CONST.
art. I, § 9.
65 If the preventive detention of persons who are only charged and not convicted, and
who therefore must be presumed innocent, has been viewed as controversial (because the
theory relies not only on predictions of future behavior but also on assumptions ofpast behavior which have not been demonstrated), then clearly rationales legitimizing pretrial detention
based on risk classification would be doubly controversial. The reason is simple: classification
of defendants into a "high risk" category based on their possession of certain attributes is
likely to produce a noticeable margin of the error in individual cases. Although most members of high risk group may eventually fail to appear in court, for example, many individuals
in that category, of course, would appear. Classification handles individual defendants as
members of groups or categories; they are tried under the criminal laws, however, as distinct
individuals. See generaly Angel, supra note 23, at 342-47.
66 In Stack v. Boyle, the Supreme Court alluded in dicta to "the traditional right [of the
accused] to freedom before conviction." 342 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1951). This right later emerged as a
presumption favoring the release of defendants under nonfinancial conditions and under least
restrictive alternatives in subsequent state and federal legislation. See Bail Reform Act of
1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976). For a discussion of state bail laws, see generally J. GOLDKAMP,
umpra note 6, at 55-75.
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the latter group (the lower risk minority) surely points to inappropriate
pretrial detention.
A major positive finding of this study lies in the potential value of a
statistically or actuarially derived evaluation of the pretrial population
based on risk. Although imperfect, the prediction instrument applied to
theJackson defendants who were specially released received secondary
validation. The finding that the instrument ranked detainees well according to risk, but underpredicted their actual rates of failure, suggests
that earlier predictive studies have suffered importantly from the exclusion of high risk defendants. Hopefully, future predictive efforts will focus productively on methods that can take into account the
characteristics of detained defendants, thereby enhancing the strength
of the predictions.
It is unfortunately true that, when applied as a yardstick to the
pretrial population as a whole as well as to theJackson designees, the
predictive classification demonstrated that detainees are disproportionately high risk. Yet, in a more positive vein, the classification scheme
also identified groups of lower risk defendants who arguably represent
inappropriate uses of detention: thirteen percent of detainees on a given
day were assessed as very low risk. Although such a predictive approach
must be used with caution-for as it was to a surprising extent accurate,
it was also notably inaccurate in individual cases-there is now some
promise that population reduction proponents, for example, guided by
assessment of risk could devise release alternatives. While certain defendants should unquestionably be released on their own recognizance,
others might be released more appropriately under various forms of supervision, such as in third party custody or to particular programs based
on the knowledge such a tool provides.6 7 In fact, had this approach
been taken injackson, the follow-up results might have been dramatically different.
Finally, as the issue of selectivity in pretrial detention sharpens in
response to concerns both about jail overcrowding and about community protection, it is critical to keep in mind the potentially adverse sideeffects of any "selectivity enhancing" measures, namely that defendants
will be confined erroneously because of their membership in a group
possessing particular attributes. The cost of these errors must be faced
squarely before implementing policy measures that seem to respond effectively to hitherto intransigent pretrial issues.

67 This recommendation, of course, is hardly original; it borrows directly from the approach of release under least restrictive conditions outlined in the Federal Bail Reform Act of
1966. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146.

